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I. INTRODUCTION 
On January 14, 2014, Governor Jerry Brown declared a state of emergency.
1
 
Suffering from severe drought since 2012, California desperately needed water 
for its communities.
2
 Governor Brown called on “all Californians to conserve 
water in every way possible” because of a decrease in agricultural production, an 
increase in wildfires, and a fear of drinking water shortages.
3
 Even before 
declaring a state of emergency, Brown signed an executive order in May 2013, 
allowing the government to implement actions more quickly and asking 
Californians to continue conserving water.
4
 
California’s water supply is a diverse puzzle.
5
 Groundwater is an essential 
piece to that puzzle.
6
 In response to an ever-increasing shortage of groundwater, 
the legislature passed the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act of 2014 
(SGMA).
7
 SGMA provided a solid foundation, however, it was not a perfect 
series of bills.
8
 In 2015, the legislature attempted to remedy the uncertainties left 
by SGMA with a slew of groundwater legislation.
9
 When these bills reached the 
Senate Committee on Natural Resources and Water, the committee consolidated 
them into Senator Fran Pavley’s bill—Chapter 255.
10
 While Chapter 255 makes 
some changes to SGMA, it does not include all possible methods for improving 
groundwater management to completely sustain California’s groundwater.
11
 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Chapter 255 attempts to aid the implementation of the Sustainable 
Groundwater Management Act.
12
 SGMA was a three-bill package comprising AB 
1739, SB 1168, and SB 1319—Governor Brown’s administration vastly 
 
1. Press Release, Office of Governor Edmond G. Brown Jr., State of Emergency Declaring Drought (Jan. 
17, 2014), available at http://gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=18368 [hereinafter Emergency Press Release] (on file 
with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. OFFICE OF ASSEMBLY MEMBER SUSAN EGGMAN, AB 647 FACT SHEET (2015–16 Reg. Sess.) 
[hereinafter AB 647 FACT SHEET] (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
6. Id. 
7. Press Release, CA Water Found., California Water Foundation Praises Gov. Brown’s Signing of 
Landmark Groundwater Legislation into Law (Sept. 16, 2014) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review). 
8. See infra Part II (explaining the legal background of SGMA). 
9. See infra note 154 and accompanying text (describing the various groundwater legislation introduced 
to remedy SGMA). 
10. See infra Part IV.B (explaining how the legislation was consolidated into Chapter 255). 
11. See infra Part IV (analyzing the changes Chapter 255 makes to SGMA and their potential impact). 
12. See 2015 Cal. STAT. ch. 255 (amending sections of the Water Code created by SGMA). 
The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 47 
643 
supported each bill.
13
 Following reports from the Association of California Water 
Agencies (ACWA), the California Water foundation (CWF), and many 
stakeholder meetings, the governor signed the three-bill package into law on 
September 16, 2014.
14
 This section will discuss Governor Brown’s support of 
SGMA, the origins of the three-bill package, and the impact ACWA and CWF 
had on SGMA’s existing law.
 15
 
A. Support from Governor Jerry Brown and the Three-Bill Package 
In January 2014, Governor Brown released his California Water Action Plan 
detailing the importance of protecting groundwater basins at risk of overdraft.
16
 
The governor believed the plan was essential for California to manage water 
wisely.
17
 He also believed that if local agencies were unable to protect 
groundwater basins, the importance of groundwater sustainability necessitated 
state intervention.
18
 In his 2014 budget, Governor Brown prioritized finding 
solutions to California’s water problems.
19
 
Soon after the Governor voiced his concerns, the legislature delved into 
groundwater regulation.
20
 In February 2014, Assembly Member Roger Dickinson 
introduced AB 1739 to give the State Water Board power to place a basin on 
probationary and to create interim plans for sustainability during that status.
21
 
Then, Senator Pavley introduced SB 1168 to allow the State Water Board to 
designate basins as “high-, medium- or low-priority.”
22
 These two bills arose 
 
13. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, SUSTAINABLE GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT ACT BROCHURE (2015), 
available at http://groundwater.ca.gov/docs/sgma_brochure_jan_2015.pdf  [hereinafter, SGMA BROCHURE] (on 
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
14.  Press Release, CA Water Found., supra note 7; ASS’N OF CAL. WATER AGENCIES, 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACHIEVING GROUNDWATER SUSTAINABILITY 1 (2014) [hereinafter 
RECOMMENDATIONS]. 
15. See infra Part II (demonstrating Governor Brown’s support and referencing the impact ACWA and 
CWF had on SGMA). 
16. OFFICE OF GOVERNOR EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., CALIFORNIA WATER ACTION PLAN 13 (2014) 
[hereinafter CALIFORNIA WATER ACTION PLAN]. 
17. Press Release, Office of Governor Edmond G. Brown Jr., Governor Brown Signs Historic 
Groundwater Legislation (Sept. 16, 2014), http://gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=18701 [hereinafter Signing Press 
Release] (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
18. CALIFORNIA WATER ACTION PLAN, supra note 16, at 14. 
19. OFFICE OF GOVERNOR EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., 2014 CALIFORNIA FIVE-YEAR INFRASTRUCTURE 
PLAN 25 (2014). 
20.  See AB 1168, 2014 Leg., 2013–2014 Sess. (Cal. 2014) (enacted by Chapter 346); AB 1739, 2014 
Leg., 2013–2014 Sess. (Cal. 2014) (enacted by Chapter 347) (illustrating the various bills introduced after 
Governor Brown mentioned the importance of preserving groundwater).  
21. Matt Williams, Groundwater Bills Move Forward in the Legislature, ASS’N OF CAL. WATER 
AGENCIES (May 28, 2014), http://www.acwa.com/news/water-news/groundwater-bills-move-forward-
legislature (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
22. AB 1168, 2014 Leg., 2013–2014 Sess. (Cal. 2014) (enacted by Chapter 346); Williams, supra note 
21. 
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from ACWA’s 2011 report emphasizing the importance of local control over 
groundwater basins.
23
 According to the report, providing local control was the 
most effective means to achieve sustainable groundwater management.
24
 
Unfortunately, local control alone was ineffective, and local agencies required 
enhanced authority to accomplish their sustainability goals.
25
 
In order to assess the policies surrounding groundwater, committees from 
both houses held informational hearings.
26
 Those hearings revealed that, at the 
time, local agencies could not create sustainable cycles of extraction because the 
groundwater pumping policies were inadequate.
27
 Soon after, Senator Pavley 
introduced SB 1319 to add additional criteria basins must meet before receiving a 
probationary status, thus strengthening the bill package.
28
 Governor Brown 
signed the three-bill package into law on September 16, 2014.
29
 
B. ACWA and CWF Influence on SGMA’s Existing Law 
The authors incorporated many of ACWA’s and CWF’s recommendations 
into the SGMA.
30
 These recommendations included defining the relationship 
between groundwater and surface water, improving local agencies’ regulatory 
tools, articulating sustainability standards, and providing a state “backstop” 
authority when local agency action fails.
31
 The SGMA also provides local 
agencies with the tools and incentives needed to protect groundwater basins and 
users’ rights.
32
 Subsection one explains the prioritization of basins and how 
 
23. See 2014 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 346 (enacting CAL. WATER CODE § 113) (emphasizing local control); 
see also Williams, supra note 21; ASS’N OF CAL. WATER AGENCIES, SUSTAINABILITY FROM THE GROUND UP: 
GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT IN CALIFORNIA—A FRAMEWORK (2011) (providing a framework for 
sustainable ground water management in California).  
24. RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 14. 
25. Id. at 9. 
26. Hearing Agenda, Joint Informational Hearing on Management of California’s Groundwater 
Resources Before the Assemb. Water, Parks & Wildlife Comm. and the Assemb. Budget Subcomm. No. 3, 2014 
Leg., 2013–2014 Sess. (Cal. 2014) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Hearing Agenda, 
Oversight Hearing on Managing California’s Groundwater: Issues and Challenge Before the S. Natural Res. & 
Water Comm., 2014 Leg., 2013–2014 Sess. (Cal. 2014) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
27. RICHARD M. FRANK, CALIFORNIA GROUNDWATER LAW: AN OVERVIEW (2014).  
28. See 2014 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 348 (giving the State Water Resources Control Board power to place a 
basin on probationary status if certain deadlines were not met). 
29. Signing Press Release, supra note 17. 
30. See AB 1168, 2014 Leg., 2013–2014 Sess. (Cal. 2014) (enacted by Chapter 346); AB 1739, 2014 
Leg., 2013–2014 Sess. (Cal. 2014) (enacted by Chapter 347); AB 1319, 2014 Leg., 2013–2014 Sess. (Cal. 
2014) (enacted by Chapter 347) (including measurable milestones every few years, giving the State Water 
Board and Department of Water Resources (DWR) “backstop” authority, and allowing local agencies to charge 
fees to enforce their GSPs are some such recommendations). 
31. RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 14, at 5–7, 9–10, 12; CAL. WATER FOUND., RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR SUSTAINABLE GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT: DEVELOPED THROUGH A STAKEHOLDER DIALOGUE 22–24, 
27–30 (2014). 
32. See CALIFORNIA WATER ACTION PLAN, supra note 16 (including basin priorities, formation of GSAs, 
and the implementation of GSPs). 
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SGMA’s deadlines affect appropriative rights.
33
 Subsection two discusses how 
private companies can join a Groundwater Sustainability Agency (GSA), and 
subsection three discusses SGMA’s requirements for implementing a 
Groundwater Sustainability Plan (GSP) and what happens when a GSA fails to 
adopt one.
34
 
1. Basin Priority and Appropriative Rights 
The Department of Water Resources (DWR) must evaluate and designate 
groundwater basins as very low, low, medium, and high-priority.
35
 Basins 
designated as high- or medium-priority must adopt a GSP by January 31, 2020.
36
 
During GSP development, SGMA prohibits groundwater users from increasing 
their water usage to expand appropriative rights.
37
 
2. Formation of a GSA 
Initiation of GSA formation may include both local agencies and private 
mutual water companies through a Joint Powers Agreement (JPA).
38
 The powers 
given to a private mutual water company are the same as the rest of the parties so 
the JPA does not alter the authority of the GSA.
39
 Once formed, the GSA must 
inform DWR of its creation and submit its area of control for evaluation.
40
 A 
single GSA need not cover the entire basin; however, all individual GSAs must 
coordinate their GSPs to reach one sustainability goal.
41
 
3. Implementation of a GSP and the Consequences of Failure 
GSAs wield authority ranging from collecting fees to conducting 
investigations in order to best implement a GSP.
42
 In order to ensure progress 
towards sustainability, a GSP must use a fifty-year “planning and implementation 
horizon” with measurable objectives and milestones every five years.
43
 If a GSA 
fails to meet SGMA’s requirements, the State Water Board may place all or part 
 
33. See infra Part II.B.1 (describing that basins are prioritized by their status of priority). 
34. See infra Part II.B.2–3 (showing that private companies can join a GSA through JPAs and 
demonstrating what happens when a GSA fails to adopt a GSP). 
35. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10720.5–10735.2 (West 2015) (existing law regarding priority under 
Sustainable Groundwater Management Act). 
36. Id. § 10735.2(a)(5)(A). 
37. Id. § 10720.5(a). 
38. Id. § 10723.6(a). 
39. Id. 
40. Id. § 10723.8(a). 
41. Id. § 10727.6. 
42. Id. §§ 10725(a), 10726.8(a). 
43. Id. §§ 10721(q), 10727.2(b)(1). 
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of a basin on probationary status and develop an interim plan of its own.
44
 
However, the State Water Board may exempt “good actors” who attempt to meet 
SGMA’s requirements, but fail because of an uncooperative party.
45
 
III. CHAPTER 255 
Chapter 255 makes some changes to the Sustainable Groundwater 
Management Act.
46
 The original SGMA left several fundamental questions 
unanswered, thereby preventing effective implementation of GSPs.
47
 Chapter 255 
attempts to remedy some of these issues by granting extensions to SGMA 
deadlines when litigation delays implementation of a GSP and by making a slight 
change to how private mutual water companies can join GSAs.
48
 
Chapter 255 reflects the possibility that litigation may prevent interested 
parties from meeting SGMA’s deadlines.
49
 For example, GSAs must establish 
basin boundaries within five years after a basin is reprioritized as medium- or 
high-priority.
50
 The State Water Board has discretion to extend that deadline for 
a period equal to the length of the litigation, if the GSA can show that litigation 
prevented implementation of a GSP that was likely to reach the GSA’s 
sustainability goal.
51
 Therefore, Chapter 255 allows the State Water Board to treat 
litigation delay as a factor when making a probationary status designation.
52
 
Chapter 255 limits private mutual water companies’ ability to join GSAs to 
either a memorandum of agreement or other limited legal agreement.
53
 Chapter 
255 removes JPAs as a possible method of forming GSAs with private mutual 
water companies.
54
 Chapter 255 also ensures that private mutual water companies 
do not gain any special or additional powers through such an agreement.
55
 
 
44. Id. § 10735.4(c). 
45. Id. § 10735.2(e). 
46. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 5202, 10720.5, 10720.7, 10722.2, 10722.4, 10723, 10723.6, 10723.8, 
10724, 10726.8, 10730.2, 10733.2, 10733.3, 10735.2, 10735.4, 10735.6, and 10933 (amended by Chapter 255) 
(amending sections of the California Water Code originally enacted by SGMA). 
47. See WATER §§ 10727.2, 10728.6 (failing to address what happens when litigation impedes 
implementation of a GSP, how a GSA can encourage the cooperation of state entities, the availability of private 
funding, and how CEQA applies to the formation of GSAs). 
48. See infra Part III (explaining the changes made by Chapter 255). 
49. See CAL. WATER CODE § 10735.2(d) (enacted by Chapter 255) (providing extensions if litigation does 
prevent meeting deadlines). 
50. Id. § 10722.4(d) (enacted by Chapter 255). 
51. Id. § 10735.2(d) (enacted by Chapter 255). 
52. Id.  
53. Id. § 10723.6(b) (enacted by Chapter 255). 
54. See id. 10723.6(b) (enacted by Chapter 255) (specifying that private mutual water companies and 
Public Utilities Companies do not have access to JPAs as a means of joining GSAs). 
55. See id. (subjecting private companies to local control). 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
The goal of Chapter 255 is to implement the Sustainable Groundwater 
Management Act efficiently and effectively.
56
 There were too many uncertainties 
to effectively adopt GSPs under SGMA.
57
 While Chapter 255 effects a few small 
changes, it is not nearly as aggressive as it could be.
58
 Allowing the State Water 
Board to stay a probationary status designation may seem like a drastic change 
from existing law, but staying the designation for a period equal in length to 
delaying litigation is not as helpful as previously proposed legislation.
59
 The two 
five-year extensions proposed in AB 617—before the Senate Committee on 
Natural Resources and Water amended it—would have provided GSAs with 
more leeway to meet deadlines in the event of litigation delays.
60
 Additionally, 
allowing private mutual water companies to join GSAs is helpful to dwindling 
GSA membership; however, preventing private mutual water companies from 
exercising JPAs limits versatility.
61
 Section A compares the deadline extensions 
in Chapter 255 and those in AB 617.
62
 Section B explores the ability for private 
mutual water companies to join GSAs.
63
 Section C discusses the changes that 
Chapter 255 did not incorporate and the possible ramifications this could have on 
SGMA.
64
 Finally, Section D examines Chapter 255 as a piece of consensus 
legislation.
65
 
 
56. See id. §§ 5202, 10720.5, 10720.7, 10722.2, 10722.4, 10723, 10723.6, 10723.8, 10724, 10726.8, 
10730.2, 10733.2, 10733.3, 10735.2, 10735.4, 10735.6, and 10933 (amended by Chapter 255) (making changes 
to SGMA that clear up questions and inefficiencies). 
57. Compare CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10720.5–10735.4 (West 2015) (showing SGMA as enacted in 2014), 
with SB 13, 2014 Leg., 2013–2014 Sess. (Cal. 2014) (enacted by Chapter 255) (amending and adding sections 
to SGMA that clarify ambiguities). 
58. Compare CAL. WATER CODE §§ 5202, 10720.5, 10720.7, 10722.2, 10722.4, 10723, 10723.6, 
10723.8, 10724, 10726.8, 10730.2, 10733.2, 10733.3, 10735.2, 10735.4, 10735.6, and 10933 (amended by 
Chapter 255) (detailing SGMA’s deadlines and procedures), with AB 617, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 
2015) (as amended on June 29, 2015, but not enacted) (proposing changes to SGMA’s deadlines and 
procedures). 
59. Compare CAL. WATER CODE § 10735.2(d) (enacted by Chapter 255) (SGMA’s litigation procedures 
regarding probationary basins), with AB 617 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as amended on June 29, 
2015, but not enacted) (proposing changes in classification of probationary basins due to delay caused by 
litigation). 
60. See AB 617, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as amended on June 29, 2015, but not enacted) 
(providing a possible extension totaling ten years—a period likely to outlast most litigation). 
61. See CAL. WATER CODE § 10735.2(b) (enacted by Chapter 255) (excluding joint powers agreements as 
a means for private mutual water companies from joining GSAs). 
62. See infra Part IV.A (comparing the deadline extensions given by AB 617 and Chapter 255). 
63. See infra Part IV.B (describing private mutual water companies and GSAs). 
64. See infra Part IV.C (demonstrating the negative implications arising from Chapter 255 not including 
some of AB 617’s proposals). 
65. See infra Part IV.D (explaining that Chapter 255 is a consolidated bill). 
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A. Defining Litigation as “Good Cause:” Chapter 255 vs. AB 617 Before 
Consolidation 
GSAs face three main types of litigation: (1) litigation challenging the GSA’s 
authority; (2) CEQA litigation for projects that have a severe impact on the 
environment; and (3) adjudications.
66
 Adjudications will likely create uncertainty 
when implementing GSPs.
67
 Also, certain adjudications must be determined 
before implementing a GSP because questions, such as the validity of pumping 
restrictions, create far-reaching consequences for everyone, from corporations to 
farmers.
68
 Both Chapter 255 and AB 617 include litigation in the definition of 
“good cause” for deadline extensions.
69
 By doing so, they clarify the vehicle by 
which the State Water Board can institute or delay state backstop procedures.
70
 
Chapter 255 allows—and AB 617 would have allowed—a GSA to have 
advanced knowledge of changed deadlines when implementing a GSP, because it 
gives DWR the ability to stay the State Water Board’s intervention.
71
 
Opponents of AB 617 probably feared that GSAs would use unrelated 
litigation to delay implementing parts of a GSP.
72
 Therefore, Chapter 255’s 
limitations on the length of extensions may relieve this concern.
73
 While 
opponents had a right to be concerned, AB 617 provided useful clarity for when 
the State Water Board could stay an intervention.
74
 With AB 617’s language, 
GSAs would have more concretely understood the length of their extensions.
75
 
DWR’s reevaluation of the extension after the first five years would almost 
certainly help mitigate any fear of unneeded delays.
76
 Chapter 255 moves in the 
right direction; however, having a definite end to deadline extensions would be 
more beneficial for GSP implementation.
77
 
 
66. Interview with Jennifer Harder, Professor, McGeorge School of Law (July 2, 2015) (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. CAL. WATER CODE § 10735.2(d); AB 617, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as amended on 
June 29, 2015, but not enacted). 
70. See AB 617, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as amended on June 29, 2015, but not enacted) 
(giving the State Water Board definitive directions to adhere to DWR’s granting of five-year extensions). 
71. See CAL. WATER CODE § 10735.2(d) (enacted by Chapter 255) (giving GSAs a deadline extension 
equal to the length of the litigation); see also AB 617, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as amended on 
June 29, 2015, but not enacted) (giving a GSA up to two five-year extensions to resolve any litigation and 
properly move forward with implementing a GSP in the most informed way possible). 
72. Interview with Jennifer Harder, supra note 66. 
73. See CAL. WATER CODE § 10735.2(d) (enacted by Chapter 255) (changing the AB 617 language to 
offer a less definite period of deadline extensions). 
74. See supra Part IV.A (defining AB 617’s “good cause” for allowing a stay of intervention). 
75. AB 617, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as amended on June 29, 2015, but not enacted). 
76. Id. (requiring DWR to reevaluate the extension after five years rather than just giving a ten-year 
extension initially). 
77. See supra Part IV.A (comparing the benefits of deadline extensions in AB 617 with Chapter 255). 
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B. Including Private Mutual Water Companies in GSAs: Chapter 255 vs. AB 
617 Before Consolidation 
Chapter 255 allows GSAs to include private mutual water companies through 
a memorandum of understanding or some other legal agreement.
78
 In contrast, 
AB 617 granted private mutual water companies all powers in common between 
members of a GSA through a JPA.
79
 One pitfall of AB 617 was that it did not 
define the transparency requirements of JPAs.
80
 This is significant because 
existing law requires different levels of public access to local public agency 
meetings and private water company meetings.
81
 To determine the benefits of AB 
617’s method, it is necessary to examine the transparency requirements for local 
public agencies, the transparency requirements of private mutual water 
companies, including pending legislation, and finally, the ambiguities between 
AB 617 and the laws governing JPAs.
82
 
1. Local Public Agency Transparency 
Local public agencies are subject to the Ralph M. Brown Act (Brown Act).
83
 
The Brown Act prohibits private discussion or deliberation of a quorum of public 
agency board members from discussing issues within their subject matter 
jurisdiction to ensure that there is transparency in their decisions.
84
 It also 
requires the public agency to publish notice of regular and advisory meetings.
85
 
The Brown Act also limits the location of these meetings to the boundary of the 
territory in which the agency exercises jurisdiction.
86
 The legislature added these 
transparency restrictions because it believed that public agencies exist for the 
people and that they should operate openly.
87
 
2. Private Mutual Water Company Transparency and Recent Legislation 
The Brown Act does not regulate private mutual water companies; however, 
Chapter 633 of the Statutes of 2013 added sections 14305–14307 to the 
Corporations Code, requiring most mutual water companies to use more 
 
78. CAL. WATER CODE § 10723.6(b) (enacted by Chapter 255). 
79. AB 617, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as amended on June 29, 2015, but not enacted). 
80. Id.  
81. Compare CAL. GOV’T CODE § 54950 (West 2015) (imposing open meeting requirements on local 
public agencies), with CAL. CORP. CODE § 14305 (West 2015) (requiring admittance of eligible parties to 
regular meetings, but not to meetings called as “executive sessions”). 
82. See infra Part IV.B.3 (discussing transparency requirements and ambiguities in the current law). 
83. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 54950 et seq. (West 2015). 
84. Id. § 54952.2(b)(1). 
85. Id. § 54954(a). 
86. Id. § 54954(b). 
87. Id. § 54950. 
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transparent practices.
88
 Dubbed the “Mutual Water Company Open Meeting Act,” 
section 14305 allows eligible parties access to board of directors’ meetings.
89
 But, 
this access ends when the board of directors meets in an “executive session.”
90
 
Currently, a board of directors can call a private, executive session for a variety 
of reasons and only record the session in the next regular meeting’s minutes.
91
 
Some do not find this method of open meetings to be effective.
92
 
Assembly Member Chris Holden introduced Chapter 669 to amend section 
14305 in 2015.
93
 Chapter 669 prohibits private mutual water company board 
members from calling executive sessions outside of a regular meeting.
94
 This 
change ensures that interested parties have access to the regular meeting even if 
they cannot listen in on the executive session.
95
 While private mutual water 
companies are not subject to the same requirements as public agencies, and while 
Chapter 669 provides more transparency, the Corporations Code imposes 
additional open meeting requirements.
96
 
3. AB 617 and Joint Powers Agreements 
As discussed above, the Brown Act does not regulate private mutual water 
companies.
97
 However, it does require JPA meetings to occur within limited 
areas.
98
 Critics of AB 617 were uncertain whether the Brown Act or California 
Corporations Code would apply to control private mutual water company 
operations.
99
 Although AB 617 no longer addresses transparency, if private 
companies were allowed to join GSAs through a JPA, it would undoubtedly 
provide more versatility to GSA formation.
100
 Thus, Chapter 255’s rejection of 
JPAs as an option to include private mutual water companies in GSAs 
significantly limits versatility.
101
 
 
88. See CAL. CORP. CODE. § 14305(b) (West 2015).  
89. Id. § 14305(b). 
90. Id. 
91. Id. § 14305(b)–(c). 
92. See AB 1077, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) (enacted by Chapter 669) (attempting to 
amend section 14305 of the California Corporations Code to restrict the occasions of executive sessions and the 
delay in recording one’s occurrence). 
93. Id. 
94. Id. § 14305(b)(2). 
95. Id. 
96. Compare CAL. GOV’T CODE § 54950 (West 2015) (imposing open meeting requirements on local 
public agencies), and AB 1077, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) (enacted by Chapter 669) (preventing 
board members from calling executive sessions outside of a general meeting), with CORP. CODE § 14305 
(providing a variety of requirements for open meetings). 
97. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
98. GOV’T CODE § 54954(d). 
99. Interview with Jennifer Harder, supra note 66. 
100. See supra Part IV.A.1–2 (discussing JPAs in relation to private mutual water companies). 
101. See supra Part IV.B (discussing the versatility of JPAs in GSA formation). 
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C. The Legal Ramifications of Not Including All of AB 617’s Proposed Changes 
AB 617 introduced several changes to SGMA that Chapter 255 excluded 
when consolidating groundwater legislation.
102
 The first change exempts forming 
GSAs from CEQA.
103
 The second creates default GSAs.
104
 The third consolidates 
the definitions of “in lieu use” and “groundwater recharge.”
105
 The final change 
AB 617 made was to the tolling provisions that prevented over allocation of 
prescriptive rights.
106
 
1. Why Have Chapter 255 Exempt GSA Formation from CEQA? 
“CEQA is a focal point of litigation against public agencies.”
107
 The 
legislature enacted CEQA to mitigate significant environmental impacts.
108
 Since 
CEQA’s enactment, the legislature has enacted more than 120 additional 
environmental laws.
109
 Unfortunately, when an agency satisfies these other 
environmental laws, it frequently expects a CEQA lawsuit.
110
 These lawsuits 
delay or entirely prevent projects with any environmental impact and often serve 
as a deterrent for even environmentally desirable projects.
111
 The fear of an 
abusive CEQA lawsuit often inhibits CEQA’s ability to protect the 
environment.
112
 
When the legislature enacted SGMA, it recognized that CEQA could 
potentially harm a GSA.
113
 SGMA exempted GSPs from CEQA.
114
 While Chapter 
255 did not remove the GSP exception to CEQA, its author did not share the 
opinion that an exception for GSA formation logically flowed backwards in the 
SGMA process.
115
 There can always be litigation about the formation of GSAs for 
 
102. See supra Part IV.A–B (comparing the provisions of AB 617 that were removed when Ab 617 was 
consolidated into Chapter 255). 
103. See infra Part IV.C.1 (discussing why exempting GSA from CEQA is beneficial). 
104. See infra Part IV.C.2 (explaining default GSAs). 
105. See infra Part IV.C.3 (discussing in lieu use of groundwater recharge). 
106. See infra Part IV.C.4 (analyzing over allocation of prescriptive rights). 
107. Interview with Jennifer Harder, supra note 66. 
108. Cal. Natural Res. Agency, Frequently Asked Questions about CEQA, http://resources.ca.gov/ceqa/ 
more/faq.html (last visited July 6, 2015) [hereinafter FAQs] (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review). 
109. POLICY PRINCIPLES FOR CEQA MODERNIZATION, CEQA WORKING GROUP (2015), available at 
http://rctc.org/uploads/media_items/ceqa-working-group-policy-principles-fact-sheet.original.pdf (on file with 
The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
110. Id. 
111. Id. 
112. See id. (stressing that thoughtful modernization of CEQA can both prevent its abuse and preserve its 
intent of protecting the environment). 
113. See CAL. WATER CODE § 10728.6 (exempting GSPs from CEQA’s requirements). 
114. Id. 
115. AB 617, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as amended on June 29, 2015, but not enacted); 
Interview with Jennifer Harder, supra note 66. 
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other reasons, but the high likelihood of a CEQA lawsuit necessitated AB 617 to 
exempt forming GSAs from CEQA.
116
 Otherwise, the GSA may not have formed 
by SGMA’s June 30, 2017 deadline and would have required DWR to grant 
extensions, ultimately delaying a basin from reaching its sustainability goal.
117
 
This effect may be undesirable, and therefore, Chapter 255 may have benefited 
from exempting GSA formation from CEQA.
118
 
2. Default GSAs 
The inability to saturate a basin with GSAs poses a common problem for 
SGMA.
119
 While relying on local control allows for tailored sustainability 
policies, local agencies might not participate.
120
 AB 617 attempted to create 
fallback agencies for when GSAs did not fully cover a basin.
121
 This type of 
situation required a delicate touch because maintaining local control was a 
cornerstone of SGMA.
122
 If the situation did arise, AB 617 would have designated 
the county in which the basin lies as the default GSA.
123
 However, the county 
could have refused to be the GSA.
124
 If the county did refuse, individual water 
users would have been required to report groundwater extractions.
125
 While this 
reporting method helps prevent unnecessary or non-beneficial pumping, a 
cooperative plan cannot exist under such reporting standards.
126
 
Without a designated GSA, the State Water Board may place part of a basin 
on probationary status and institute an interim plan.
127
 Unfortunately, this would 
defeat the purpose of utilizing local agencies to create sustainability.
128
 Without 
further refinement, AB 617 failed to determine who would be next in line as a 
 
116. See infra text accompanying notes 141–42. 
117. See generally AB 617, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as amended on June 29, 2015, but 
not enacted). 
118. See supra Part IV.C.1 (detailing the benefits of exempting GSA formation rom CEQA). 
119. Interview with Jennifer Harder, supra note 66. 
120. See AB 617, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as amended on June 29, 2015, but not 
enacted) (anticipating that local agencies may not elect to for GSAs). 
121. See id. (designating the county in which the basin lies as the fallback GSA). 
122. See e.g., AB 1168, 2014 Leg., 2013–2014 Sess. (Cal. 2014) (enacted by Chapter 346); AB 1739, 
2014 Leg., 2013–2014 Sess. (Cal. 2014) (enacted by Chapter 347). 
123. AB 617, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as amended on June 29, 2015, but not enacted). 
124. Id.  
125. Id. 
126. See CAL. WATER CODE § 5203 (West 2015) (requiring detailed reports by individual groundwater 
extractors but offering no overall protection of the groundwater basin). 
127. AB 617, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as amended on June 29, 2015, but not enacted) 
128. Compare id. (resulting in sustainability plan by the State Water Board—a state entity), with SGMA 
BROCHURE, supra note 13 (stating that the goal of SGMA is to provide local agencies with control over 
groundwater basins). 
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default GSA.
129
 When Chapter 255 consolidated AB 617, it did not clarify this 
question.
130
 Of course, an interim plan creates more sustainability than no plan, 
but the goal of the SGMA required full participation by local agencies.
131
 AB 617 
moved toward the goal of sustainability, but Chapter 255 did not build upon that 
progress.
132
 
3. In Lieu Use as Groundwater Recharge 
The concept of “in lieu use” refers to using surface water in place of 
groundwater systems to recharge over-drafted groundwater basins.
133
 Section 
1200 of the California Water Code, which gives the State Water Board 
jurisdiction over surface water and subterranean streams, has necessitated in lieu 
use.
134
 This necessity arose because Courts have upheld Section 1200 as 
excluding percolating groundwater, limiting the State Water Board’s ability to 
utilize those particular subterranean systems.
135
 This limitation is significant 
because the use of percolating groundwater would drastically increase 
California’s ability to recharge over-drafted basins.
136
 Recently, a concept called 
“interconnected systems” has affected in lieu use.
137
 Interconnected systems are a 
combination of surface water and groundwater systems that become 
interconnected when percolating groundwater is pumped in amounts that begin to 
affect surface water levels.
138
 These interconnected systems may give the State 
 
129. See AB 617, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as amended on June 29, 2015, but not 
enacted) (failing to designate another GSA should a county refuse to be the default). 
130. See 2015 Cal. STAT. ch. 255 (failing to designate another GSA should a county reguse to be the 
default as well). 
131. See SGMA BROCHURE, supra note 13 (stating that the intent of SGMA is to provide a framework for 
local agencies to sustainably manage groundwater basins). 
132. See supra Part IV.C.2 (discussing the progress AB 617 made toward sustainability). 
133. See Interview with Jennifer Harder, supra note 66 (referring to “in liue use” as using surface water to 
recharge groundwater basins). 
134. CAL. WATER CODE §1200 (West 2015); Interview with Jennifer Harder, supra note 66. 
135. See N. Gualala Water Co. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 139 Cal. App. 4th 1577, 1606 (2006) 
(upholding the State Water Board’s four-part test to differentiate subterranean streams from percolating 
groundwater and thus granting the State Water Board jurisdiction because the groundwater in question was 
determined to be a subterranean stream); see also Interview with Jennifer Harder, supra note 66 (discussing 
subterranean streams and how they are different from percolating groundwater). 
136. See AB 617, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as amended on June 29, 2015, but not 
enacted) (including surface water in lieu of groundwater as a method to replenish depleted groundwater basins). 
137. See AB 617, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as amended on June 29, 2015, but not 
enacted) (defining “significant depletions of interconnected surface waters” as having to do with a reduction in 
surface water flows that are connected to groundwater basins); see also Interview with Harder, supra note 66 
(discussing the reduction in surface water flows that are connected to groundwater). 
138. See supra note 137 (defining “interconnected systems”).  
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Water Board a method to obtain jurisdiction over percolating groundwater using 
the Public Trust Doctrine and are the subject of ELF v. The State Water Board.
139
  
The State Water Board has jurisdiction over all publicly used waterways 
through the Public Trust Doctrine.
140
 When pumping percolating groundwater 
affects surface water and harms the public uses covered under the Public Trust 
Doctrine, it is uncertain whether the State Water Board then has jurisdiction over 
the percolating groundwater.
141
 The outcome of ELF v. The State Water Board 
could define whether groundwater recharge can include “in lieu” use in its 
definition, but by not resolving the issue statutorily, Chapter 255 leaves the issue 
to the uncertainties of litigation.
142
 While groundwater recharge remains essential 
to over-drafted groundwater basins, the ambiguity of what counts as groundwater 
recharge will inhibit enough recharge from happening until it is resolved.
143
  
Opponents of AB 617 feared that including in lieu use as groundwater 
recharge would allow users to abuse the system through false claims of 
groundwater recharge.
144
 While this fear was legitimate, AB 617 provided a 
means to increase sorely needed groundwater recharge.
145
 Therefore, Chapter 255 
should have considered merging the definition of “in lieu use” with that of 
“groundwater recharge.”
146
 
4. Over-Allocation of Prescriptive Rights 
The State Water Board bases prescriptive groundwater rights on how much 
water a rights-holder actually uses.
147
 The opposition feared a “rush to the pump 
house” where water users attempt to increase their appropriation rights by 
increasing their usage amount during the evaluation period.
148
 Opponents 
 
139. See Second Amended Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive 
Relief, Envtl. Law Found. Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’n v. State Water Res. Control Bd., Case No. 
34-2010-80000583 (Oct. 4, 2013) (requesting that the Court require the State Water Board use the Public Trust 
Doctrine to prevent Siskiyou County from issuing well-drilling permits); see also Interview with Harder, supra 
note 66 (discussing the State Water Board use of the Public Trust Doctrine). 
140. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 444 (1983); Interview with Harder, supra 
note 66. 
141. Compare Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 33 Cal. 3d. at 436 (holding that the Public Trust Doctrine should 
apply to the “extraction of water that destroys navigation and other public interests” [emphasis omitted]), and 
Interview with Harder, supra note 66, with Second Amended Petition, supra note 139 (continuing litigation 
regarding the Public Trust Doctrine). 
142. See Second Amended Petition, supra note 139 (continuing litigation that may give the State Water 
Board the ability to regulate percolating groundwater extraction if the Public Trust Doctrine applies). 
143. AB 647 FACT SHEET, supra note 5, at 2. 
144. Interview with Jennifer Harder, supra note 66. 
145. See AB 647 FACT SHEET, supra note 5, at 2 (explaining the dire importance of groundwater recharge 
in California). 
146. See supra Part IV.C.3 (showing the benefits of including “in lieu use” in the definition of 
groundwater recharge). 
147. FAQs, supra note 108 
148. Interview with Harder, supra note 66. 
The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 47 
655 
believed that changing the language of the tolling requirements would cause 
water users to “rush to the pump house” before the actual adoption of the GSP.
149
 
Once GSP implementation occurred, GSAs could begin regulating percolating 
groundwater rights for the first time.
150
 AB 617 could have approached the 
prescriptive right allocation issue more carefully, and, for this reason, Chapter 
255’s failure to change the prescriptive right tolling provisions may not have 
been in error.
151
  
D. Chapter 255 as Consensus Legislation 
Legislators put forth several groundwater bills during the 2015 session, 
including Chapter 255, AB 453, AB 939, AB 1242, and AB 617.
152
 When these 
bills reached the Senate Committee on Natural Resources and Water—chaired by 
Senator Pavley—the Committee consolidated each bill into Chapter 255.
153
 
Streamlining these bills into one piece of legislation would have been 
effective, if that single streamlined bill had incorporated language that 
would have better implemented SGMA’s objectives.154 Chapter 255 is a less 
effective piece of consensus legislation because it does not include the aggressive 
changes AB 617 contained, which would have provided more opportunities to 
achieve the goal of groundwater sustainability.
155
 Senator Pavley’s strong and 
focused leadership over groundwater legislation this session has left SGMA in 
nearly the same state as when enacted.
156
 
There is a clear difference between Chapter 255 and AB 617 in the number 
of changes each made and the aggressiveness of those changes: Chapter 255 only 
makes two substantive changes, neither of which are as aggressive as AB 617’s 
suggested changes.
157
 Furthermore, three of the four changes Chapter 255 
excluded had promising possibilities for bettering SGMA and achieving 
 
149. Id. (discussing the tolling requirements change of restricting pumping between January 1, 2015 and 
when a GSP is adopted to between January 1, 2015 and when an “action to regulate groundwater extractions” 
occurs) 
150. Id. 
151. See supra Part IV.C.4 (discussing the merits of not accepting AB 617’s changes to the tolling 
provisions). 
152. AB 453, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as amended on July 6, 2015, but not enacted); AB 
939, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as introduced on February 26, 2015, but not enacted); AB 1242, 
2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as amended on May 5, 2015, but not enacted); AB 617, 2015 Leg., 
2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015)  (as amended on June 29, 2015, but not enacted). 
153. See 2015 Cal. STAT. ch. 255 (as amended May 21, 2015, but not enacted) (consolidating AB 453, 
AB 939, AB 1242, and AB 617 into Chapter 255). 
154. See supra text accompanying note 49. 
155. AB 617, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as amended on June 29, 2015, but not enacted). 
156. See supra Part IV.C (discussing the possible changes to SGMA that Chapter 255 could have made). 
157. See supra notes 115, 129, 145 and accompanying text. 
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groundwater sustainability.
158
 But, as Governor Brown has made clear, now is not 
the time to make small adjustments to groundwater sustainability.
159
 If the State 
cannot recharge its groundwater aquifers and create sustainable groundwater 
plans, then irreversible consequences, such as land subsidence, will continue to 
plague California’s groundwater basins.
160
 Perhaps SGMA and Chapter 255 will 
be enough for California’s groundwater basins to avoid the permanent and 
irreversible damage that is already beginning to take place and that more drastic 
legislation is not necessary.
161
 
V. CONCLUSION 
California relies heavily on its water supply to provide drinking water, 
promote agriculture, and prevent fires.
162
 Groundwater is an essential part of that 
supply.
163
 Ensuring that California uses its groundwater basins in a sustainable 
manner is essential to navigating the current drought and protect against future 
droughts.
164
 While imperfect, SGMA is a step toward obtaining statewide 
groundwater sustainability.
165
 Chapter 255 fleshes out SGMA, but SGMA may 
require more aggressive changes to ensure a steady stream of sustainable 
groundwater in California.
166
 
 
 
158. See supra Part IV.C (discussing how exempting GSA formation from CEQA, identifying default 
GSAs, and including in lieu use in the definition of groundwater recharge would benefit SGMA).  
159. See AB 647 FACT SHEET, supra note 5 (detailing the dire situations of over-drafted groundwater 
aquifers). 
160. Id. 
161. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
162. See Emergency Press Release, supra note 1 (asking Californians to conserve water to protect 
agriculture, prevent fires, and prevent a shortage in drinking water). 
163. AB 647 FACT SHEET, supra note 5. 
164. See id. (explaining the importance of groundwater recharge—a part of sustainable basin operation—
to prevent permanent damage). 
165. Press Release, CA Water Found., supra note 7, at 1. (quoting Lester Snow, executive director of the 
California Water Foundation, that SGMA was “a long overdue system for managing groundwater resources”). 
166. See supra Part IV.A–B (discussing changes to SGMA that could help reach permanent groundwater 
sustainability). 
